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INNOVATION IN COMPLEMENTARY INTERNET
MARKETS
Mark R. Patterson*
INTRODUCTION
A common use of the Internet is as a new means for delivering existing
products. In some instances, the entity delivering the product is the original
producer of it and simply uses the Internet as an additional means of
delivery. This describes, for example, the Internet ventures through which
the major record companies formerly made available their recordings. 1 In
other instances, though, a new entity uses the Internet to deliver another's
product, and in doing so it may or may not have the cooperation of the
original producer. Entities playing this sort of role include Amazon.com
and peer-to-peer ("P2P") file transfer services like Napster and, more
recently, Grokster.
When these new Internet entities deliver, or facilitate the delivery of,2
products protected by another's intellectual property rights, the result has
generally been controversial. So, for example, when Napster made it easy
to search for and transfer musical recordings, record companies sued it for
copyright infringement. 3 But Napster, like other new Internet entities,
argued that it was not an infringer of the record companies' products, but
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Justin Hughes
and Timothy Wu for helpful comments and Amy Mikolajczyk for excellent research
assistance.
1. MusicNet and Pressplay initially were joint ventures among recording companies,
and each offered their joint-venturer companies' music to consumers online. See generally
Harry First, American Antitrust Institute Network Access Project, Online Music (2002),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/204c.pdf (describing MusicNet and Pressplay in the
context of other means of music distribution). Both have since changed their structures. See
MusicNet History, http://www.musicnet.com/printTemplate.html?file=xml/corporate
information/about us/history.xml&page=History (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) (stating that
MusicNet does not itself sell music to consumers, but supports the services of others that do
so); Press Release, Napster.com, Roxio Acquires Pressplay as the Foundation for the Re-
launch of Napster (May 19, 2003), http://www.napster.com/press-releases/pr_030519.html
(describing the acquisition of Pressplay by Roxio for use in relaunching a service under the
Napster label).
2. The providers of peer-to-peer ("P2P") services do not generally deliver the products
themselves, but provide their users with the ability to deliver the products.
3. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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had instead created an entirely new product that served as a complement to
the music recordings. 4
This Article addresses these conflicting claims. The paradigmatic case
that I will discuss is the introduction of what I will call a "New Service"
that provides a new way of delivering or using "Old Products." Thus,
Napster gave computer users the ability to use song files in a new way.5
Another example of a New Service is Google's AdWords, which, by
allowing buyers to purchase the right to have their URLs appear when
searches are made for others' trademarks, 6 uses the trademarks (the Old
Products) in a new way. Other examples include the use of trademarks as
metatags in World Wide Web ("web") pages in order to place the pages in
search results 7 and Google's new Print service for searching books.8
The Article asks two questions about these cases. First, what sort of
contribution must a seller make for it to be appropriate to view its
contribution as a truly New Service, rather than merely as free riding on Old
Products? I will argue that whether a New Service in fact creates a new
market turns on whether its value depends directly on the value of particular
instances of the Old Products on which it is built. In most cases where
there is such a dependence, the price charged by the provider of the New
Service will vary with the particular Old Products at issue. That price
variance will then be evidence that the New Service is, to some extent,
merely part of the Old Product market; if not, it is indeed new.
Second, what is the legal significance of the creation of a new market, or
of the failure to create one? This question is more difficult. Generally
speaking, a product in a new market would be viewed as outside the scope
of intellectual property protections in the old, distinct market.9  But
doctrines of vicarious and contributory infringement may impose secondary
4. This position was articulated most clearly in the Opposition of Defendant Napster,
Inc. to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (Nos. C 99-5183, C 00-0074), available
at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/Napster/opposition.pdf.
5. By "using" the Old Products, I mean to include not just the acts of putting them to
their ultimate uses, but also any other acts in which users wish to engage. So, for example,
in the case of Napster and song files, I mean to include not just listening to the songs (or
playing the song files), but also transferring the song files from one user to another.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the operation of AdWords, see infra notes 21-23
and accompanying text.
7. See infra text accompanying note 91.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 29-31. The issues discussed here have also been
discussed by Timothy Wu. See Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103
Mich. L. Rev. 278 (2004). He focuses particularly on copyright, where the Old Product
market is copyrighted content and the New Service market is typically the dissemination of
that content, and he provides an excellent discussion of how copyright has evolved its
current focus on dissemination. See id The focus here is somewhat more general and
emphasizes the secondary liability issues. In a sense, the goal here is to answer a question
left open by Wu. See id. at 362 ("[U]nlike other technological challengers throughout
history, it is not at all clear that entities like Napster, Aimster, or KaZaA represent legitimate
market entrants.").
[Vol. 74
COMPLEMENTAR Y INTERNET MARKETS
liability on the creator of a New Service that is used by others to infringe an
Old Product. I argue here that it is the distinction between the Old Product
market and the New Service market that should determine whether
secondary liability is appropriate.
Although the approach presented in this Article was developed before the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,10 it is not necessarily inconsistent with the Court's
decision. The test proposed here is consistent with the one set out in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,1 and that aspect of the
Sony decision was not disturbed in Grokster.12 In fact, Grokster itself
focused in part on considerations analogous to those discussed here, though
it ultimately relied on an alternative rationale beyond the scope of this
Article. 13
I. NEW SERVICES FOR OLD PRODUCTS
To illustrate the considerations on which this Article focuses, it is helpful
to compare P2P services like Napster and Grokster with Google's AdWords
program. P2P services facilitate, to a greater or lesser extent,
communication between users of the services. 14  The distinguishing
characteristic of these services is that the communication is initiated and
directed not by the services themselves, but by the users.15 That is, the
communication is essentially user-to-user, or peer-to-peer, and the service
itself merely provides passive assistance.
It is the level of assistance that the services provide that has been the key
issue in the legal challenges that have been brought against them, at least
until the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster.16 Napster provided a
centralized database of the files that users could obtain from other users. 17
10. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
11. 464 U.S. 417(1984).
12. See infra note 26.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
14. For example, both Grokster and StreamCast offered free software that enabled their
users to search other users' databases for available files. The P2P networks enabled users
who downloaded the software to communicate with other users and submit requests for
downloads as well as to make files available for downloading by other users. Grokster, 125
S. Ct. at 2771; see also discussion infra note 15.
15. The Grokster program caused a user's request to be sent to a "supernode" computer
(which was not a Grokster computer) that had been given an indexing capacity by the
software, or to "some other computer with comparable power and capacity to collect
temporary indexes of the files available on the computers of users connected to it." Grokster,
125 S. Ct. at 2771. StreamCast's software utilized the Gnutella network and was similar in
function to Grokster's system "except that in some versions of the Gnutella protocol there
[were] no supernodes." Id. Neither company kept an index of the files available from its
users, so both versions of software served the function of facilitating communication among
users without hosting a central index.
16. In fact, that issue may still be important for cases without the sort of intent evidence
in Grokster. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
17. In fact, "Napster allow[ed] a user to locate other users' MP3 files in two ways:
through Napster's search function and through its 'hotlist' function." A&M Records, Inc. v.
2005]
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With Grokster, on the other hand, users obtained lists of available files
directly from other users. 18 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
viewed this distinction as critical in Grokster, where it stated that "[t]he
nature of the relationship between Grokster and StreamCast and their users
is significantly different from the nature of the relationship between...
prior versions of Napster and its users, since Grokster and StreamCast are
more truly decentralized, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks," in contrast to
the "integrated service" provided by Napster. 19
This focus on the relationship between the New Service and its users is
related to, but somewhat different from, the focus of this Article. The
argument here is that the focus should be on the relationship between the
New Service and the Old Products. That is, it is not as important whether
the New Service aids its users in infringement as whether it does so by
creating something new or by free riding directly on the infringement.
Because the P2P services did not themselves profit directly from the
infringement, as is discussed below, they should not be secondarily liable
for it.20
The AdWords program works differently. AdWords sells link or ad
placements on the web pages where it displays the results of users' searches
for particular trademarks or other words associated with particular sellers. 21
Sellers can purchase the right to have links to their web sites appear in the
search results for particular keywords, and their links appear before the
normal search results. 22  After paying an initial activation fee, these
"advertisers"--Google's term for those who purchase keywords through the
AdWords service-pay additional fees every time users click on their
links.23
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to search Napster's index, the
user "accesse[d] a form in the MusicShare software stored in his computer and enter[ed]
either the name of the song or an artist as the object of the search." Id. Once Napster
received the request, the server automatically compared the request to MP3 file names listed
on its search index and compiled a list for the searching user. The "hotlist" function allowed
a user to create a list of other users' names from whom the user had copied MP3 files in the
past. When a "hotlist" user logged onto the Napster system "the system alert[ed] the user if
any other user on his list (a 'hotlisted user') [was] also logged onto the system," allowing
users to access all of the files located in a hotlisted user's library. Id.
18. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that "both StreamCast's
decentralized, Gnutella-type network and Grokster's quasi-decentralized, supemode...
network" do not maintain a central index or "control over index files" on individual
computers. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
19. Id. at 1165.
20. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va.
2004).
22. Google AdWords Help Center: Where Will My Ads Appear?,
https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6119 (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
23. Google charges a nominal one-time activation fee of five dollars. After the initial
fee, advertisers determine the amount they are willing to pay per click and per day. The
maximum cost-per-click ("CPC") ranges from five cents to one hundred dollars. Google
AdWords Help Center: How Much Does AdWords Cost?,
[Vol. 74
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Google thus charges directly for the use of the trademarks of others. It is
therefore involved in any trademark infringement 24 in a more direct way
than the P2P services are involved in copyright infringement. Moreover,
Google certainly plays a greater role in AdWords than Grokster does for
those who use it to transfer files: Google delivers the product (the search
results) to users, but Grokster does not. And Google probably should be
viewed as playing a greater role in infringing activity than Napster as well,
because, although Napster delivered file names to users, it did not deliver
the recordings themselves, while Google does deliver search results. These
points are elaborated below, following a discussion of current doctrine and
its origins.
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE
The basic doctrinal rule in the P2P area asks whether the New Service
has, or is capable of, substantial noninfringing uses. This rule was
established in Sony,25 and it apparently survives after Grokster.26 Sony did
not make clear, though, what constitutes a "substantial" noninfringing
use.27 This uncertainty persisted in Grokster, where the two concurring
https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer-6382 (last visited Sept. 12,
2005). Google also provides assistance to advertisers in determining the per-click fee that
will maximize the advertisers' exposure, as well as in estimating the approximate per-day
costs of the per-click fees selected. Google Adwords Help Center: What Are Steps for
Setting My Maximum CPC?,
https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6385 (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
24. As discussed in note 89 infra, there is some question as to whether the use of
trademarks in AdWords qualifies as trademark infringement.
25. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
26. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the Sony doctrine,
"which it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the
case applied." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778
(2005). Finding it unnecessary "to add a more quantified description of the point of balance
between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge
that unlawful use will occur," the Court left "further consideration of the Sony rule for a day
when that may be required." Id. at 2778-79.
27. This was evident in the Grokster amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court, which
advocated a variety of interpretations. See Brief for Creative Commons as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 23-24, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 520502 (arguing that the Sony test is simply
whether the product is capable of substantial noninfringing use, "regardless of the current
proportion of legal versus illegal uses"); Brief of the National Venture Capital Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7-9, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 497759 (emphasizing the
importance of taking into account possible future uses); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/050124_USAmicusBr04-480.pdf. ("The
proper focus of the Sony inquiry is on the commercial significance to the defendant's
business of the noninfringing use in comparison to the infringing use.").
2005]
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opinions differed on whether Grokster would have been liable under the
"substantial noninfringing use" test.28
The uncertainty of the "substantial noninfringing use" test can perhaps be
traced to Sony's derivation of the test from patent law, where the focus is
somewhat different. In patent law, the contributory infringement question
traditionally turned on whether the accused product was within the scope of
the patent. 29 Sony reaffirms the centrality of this question, observing that
the problem with the court of appeals' decision below is that it "would
enlarge the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass
control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright
protection." 30
Unfortunately, the question of whether a product is within the "scope" of
a statutory monopoly is also notoriously vague. Congress clarified the test
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.3 1
The scope issue appears here in the requirement that the infringing product
be "a material part of the invention." 32 Sony's "substantial noninfringing
use" test also appears in § 271(c), but the focus in patent law has not been
so much on the "substantiality" of noninfringing uses, but on whether the
allegedly infringing use was within the scope of the intellectual property
owner's monopoly.3 3
28. Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that the
defendants' software was "overwhelmingly used to infringe"), with id. at 2788-91 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (describing a variety of noninfringing files on Grokster's network, referring
to a "significant future market for noninfringing uses," and stating that under the Sony test
"the law will not impose copyright liability upon the distributors of dual-use technologies...
unless the product in question will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights").
29. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1944). The test
currently turns on the distinction between staple and non-staple products. See infra text
accompanying note 31. That test, however, can still be viewed as one turning on the scope
of the invention, though it defines the scope more broadly than did cases like Mercoid. Cf
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 214 (1980) (describing the non-
staple, but unpatented product at issue as "the heart of respondent's invention").
30. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
32. Id.
33. In Dawson Chemical, where the Court considered the relationship between § 271(c)
and § 271(d), governing patent misuse, the Court described the issue as whether the patentee
"is barred from seeking relief against contributory infringement of its patent rights, if it
exploits the patent only in conjunction with the sale of an unpatented article that constitutes a
material part of the invention and is not suited for commercial use outside the scope of the
patent claims." 448 U.S. at 179.
[Vol. 74
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In fact, Professor Jane C. Ginsburg has argued that it is a similar
approach-that is, a focus on the relationship between the product that
allegedly contributes to infringement and the nature of the product
infringed-that historically has driven the Supreme Court's contributory
infringement decisions in copyright law. The Court has focused, she says,
on two categories of cases:
The first covers new technological modes of dissemination of works,
when copyright owners seek not to obliterate the technology, but to be
paid for the new means of exploitation, for example, radio broadcast of
musical compositions. In these cases, the new means of exploitation often
is also perceived as competing with the old. Here, copyright owners have
generally prevailed. The second category comprehends new
technological modes of dissemination of works, when copyright owners
are perceived to be trying to prevent these new means from becoming
available to the public. This is the class of cases in which copyright
owners have consistently fared ill.
34
In the second category, Professor Ginsburg includes such technologies as
piano rolls and cable retransmission of broadcast television.35 In discussing
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,36 a case involving piano
rolls, she argues that it was likely the copyright owners' effort to control the
piano roll technology, which was not within their copyright monopoly, that
determined the result:
It is more likely that the White-Smith Court anticipated that copyright
owner claims regarding unauthorized pianola rolls were an initial sally in
the larger battle over music copyright owners' exclusive reproduction
rights-a battle whose outcome would determine control over the
emerging new technology of phonograms. The Court may have suspected
that the music publishers were endeavoring either to prevent the
distribution of a new format that competed with sheet music, or, equally
perniciously, to control the market for phonogram recording equipment
and phonograph players.3 7
Thus, both the Supreme Court's patent-law-derived test in Sony, or at
least its origin, and the Court's historical pattern of decisions can be said to
reflect the same fundamental question: whether the accused products are in
what Sony called "substantially unrelated areas of commerce." 38 Or, to use
more economic terms, the question is whether the accused product is in the
same market as the intellectual property at issue, or is in a separate market.
34. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1619 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 1622-23
36. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
37. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 1622.
38. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
2005]
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III. COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS
Economists distinguish between substitute goods and complementary
goods. Two goods are substitutes when an increase in the price for one
good, and thus a decrease in the quantities of that good purchased, causes
an increase in the purchases of the other. 39 Two goods are complementary
when an increase in the purchases of one leads to an increase in demand for
the other.40 A typical example of complementary goods is bread and butter:
If more consumers purchase bread, more will demand butter. The same is
true of, to take a more relevant example, recorded music and music
distribution: If more consumers have recorded music, more will demand a
means to transfer it, and vice versa. These market relationships can be
represented in the following diagram:
Traditional Distribution
(Record Stores, etc.)
Figure 1.
The basic idea here is that new avenues for distribution of recorded music
to consumers will increase the demand for recorded music. This seems
quite plausible for P2P services. To the extent that consumers find P2P
services more desirable than traditional music distribution, they will acquire
39. Paul M. Johnson, Substitute Goods,
http://www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/substitute goods (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
40. Paul M. Johnson, Complementary Goods,
http://www.aubum.edu/-johnspm/gloss/complementarygoods (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
Though the relationship is usually defined by reference to the effect of the demand for the
second good on changes in the price of the first good, price actually causes this effect by
changing the quantity of the first good purchased. See id.
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more recorded music. 41 This is complicated, of course, by the fact that they
might not obtain the recorded music from the record companies that own
the copyrights to that music. That issue is discussed below, 42 but it does
not alter the fact that the availability of new means of distribution generally
increases the demand for the product distributed. 43 That is, even if users of
Napster or Grokster had to pay for the music they received, they would
likely demand more music than they would have in the absence of those
services. This is evidenced by the success of Apple's iTunes service,
whose users pay for music that they obtain online and gain access to a
service similar in some respects to Napster and Grokster.44
In contrast, consider Google's AdWords, represented in Figure 2:
Trademarks
Traditional Uses Google (Including AdWords Used by
(Advertising, etc.) Ad Words used by Seller Other thanTrademark Owner) Trademark Owner
Consumer Looking for Consumer Looking for
Trademark Owner's Product Without
Products Regard toc Seler
Figure 2.
41. The greater desirability is likely to result from the ability of P2P services to deliver
music at lower cost to some consumers, though it is also possible that the New Service could
be, for example, more costly but more convenient. Cf. Wu, supra note 9, at 293 & n.42, 294.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
44. See Apple-iTunes-Music, http://www.apple.com/itunes/music/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2005). It is possible that Apple has not increased the demand for recorded music, but has
just replaced in-store purchases; given the volume of iTunes purchases, however, that seems
unlikely. See id (noting that iTunes users have purchased more than 500 million songs).
2005]
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Consumers are split into two groups in this diagram because some users of
AdWords put trademarks to a different use than do traditional users of
trademarks. Specifically, some users of AdWords presumably use that
service to direct them to sites that are similar to, but not the same as, the
one of the owner of the trademark that they enter as a search term. (At least
one hopes that some users want the service to work in that way, since that is
in fact what it does.)
The key difference, though, between P2P services and AdWords lies in
the fact that some users who use trademarks on Google to search for the
trademark owners may be led by AdWords to sites of other sellers, even if
they would prefer to go to the trademark owners' sites. These users are
represented in Figure 2 by the dotted line. For these users, the addition of
AdWords may in fact make the use of the trademarks less desirable.
Consequently, users may use trademarks as a search technique less often, in
which case AdWords would not be a complement to trademarks. 45
This difference between P2P services and AdWords arises because
AdWords, as a New Service, does not deliver the Old Product in the same
way as it was delivered previously. For at least some customers-those
who are searching for the trademark owner's site-the Old Product is
delivered in an unsatisfactory way. The effect is similar to that which
would be produced if P2P services delivered adulterated recordings to
users.46 Indeed, this has been a concern regarding the use of digital rights
management technologies with recordings. 47 The introduction of a New
Service that delivers Old Products in a less desirable way may serve not
only to make the New Service undesirable, but also to make the Old
Products themselves less desirable.48
45. It is possible that AdWords would not reduce the traditional uses of trademarks,
because even consumers who found the AdWords use of trademarks undesirable might
continue to use trademarks to search for sellers when they were not using Google or other
search engines. But it seems plausible that AdWords has the potential for reducing the use
of trademarks to search in Google, so in that sense AdWords and trademarks may not
function as complements.
46. In fact, some record companies are said to post adulterated files on P2P services. See
Les McLain, R!AA Posting Bad Music Files to Deter Illegal Downloaders, Daily Texan,
Feb. 6, 2004,
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/media/paper4l0/news/2004/02/06/WorldNation/Riaa-
Posting.Bad.Music.Files.To.Deter.Illegal.Downloaders-599824.shtml; Sue Zeidler, Music
Labels Plant Online Decoys, Mull Lawsuits, Electronic Musician, July 5, 2002,
http://emusician.com/news/emusicmusic labelsjplant/. In this way, they hope to use their
own recorded music products to harm the complementary product, P2P services.
47. See, e.g., Paul Boutin, Philips Burning on Protection, Wired News, Feb. 4, 2002,
http://wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,50101,00.html; John Alexander Halderman,
Evaluating New Copy-Prevention Techniques for Audio CDs (2002),
http://ukcdr.org/issues/cd/links/haldermandrm2002pp.pdf.
48. The distinction operating here is not, however, that between complements and
substitutes. It is instead one between complements and, if you will, anti-complements. That
is, it is not that consumers purchase the New Service instead of the Old Product, but that
they purchase the Old Product through the New Service, and that doing so makes the Old
Product less attractive.
[Vol. 74
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It is important to note that the point here is not just that some New
Services may make it more difficult for the provider of an Old Product to
capture the value of its product, as with P2P services, but that the New
Service can actually lessen the value of the Old Product, as with AdWords.
That is, as a result of the introduction of the New Service, there can be less
value to capture, even if the original provider of the Old Product were able
to capture it all. As described in the next section, this consideration can be
used to derive an approach to determining whether it is appropriate to
impose secondary liability.
IV. A TEST FOR CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
An analytical difficulty in the context of services like Napster and
AdWords is that the producer of the New Service does not just introduce
the new service but also provides the Old Product, or allows another to do
so. Thus, the role of P2P services is not fully captured by Figure 1 above,
but is better represented by Figure 3:49
Figure 3.
In contrast to Figure 1, this figure makes clear that even if P2P services do
in fact increase the demand for recorded music, the record companies may
49. This figure echoes one in Wu, supra note 9, at 287.
20051
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not receive any benefit from the increased demand, because the increased
demand may be met by infringing distribution by others.
As described in the previous section, this cost to the record companies
may be counterbalanced to some extent by a benefit in the recorded music
market: The P2P services actually increase the demand for the product
produced by the record companies. Surely some users are more inclined to
obtain recorded music, and even to purchase it, because P2P services allow
them to share it with others.50  Because the P2P services have this
complementary effect, it is not obviously appropriate (though it may
ultimately be so 5 1) to hold them secondarily liable for infringement by those
operating in the recorded-music market, at least as long as the markets
remain distinct.52
As described above, it was the distinctness of markets that was the focus
of the patent-law doctrines from which the Supreme Court in Sony derived
its test for secondary liability, though the "substantial noninfringing use"
test redirected that focus. 53 The noninfringing use test, however, does not
focus on the relationship between the market in which infringement occurs,
the Old Product market, and the New Service market, but instead focuses
on whether there exists some other market-the noninfringing-use
market-at the level of the Old Product market that is also related to the
New Service. That is, the liability of the producer of the New Service is
determined not by its relationship with the infringers, but by whether it also
has a relationship with others. This seems a less appropriate emphasis for a
secondary liability test than does the original emphasis on whether the two
markets at issue are distinct.
This Article therefore seeks to refocus the inquiry on the question of
whether the New Service and Old Product markets are distinct. One
difficulty in addressing this question arises because users typically do not
obtain the New Service and the Old Product in separate market transactions.
For example, a user may obtain a P2P program from a provider in a
particular "transaction," but the user does not pay for the program, and the
users of P2P services do not obtain sound recordings through any market
transaction. In the case of AdWords, Google and the keyword purchaser
engage in a market transaction, but the "users" of AdWords (the Google
searchers) do not necessarily enter into market transactions with either of
the other two parties.
50. The welfare effects of the sharing of information goods like recorded music are not
always obvious, either for users or for producers. See Yannis Bakos et al., Shared
Information Goods (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
67, 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=130904.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82 (discussing the possibility of specific
statutory remedies).
52. As Timothy Wu describes, this is an argument that has been made by many New
Service providers in the past. See Wu, supra note 9, at 301 (relating to phonographs).
53. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984).
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It seems clear though that one element that tends to show that the markets
are distinct is independence of the pricing of the New Service from
particular instances of the Old Product.54 The existence of a pricing
dependency would indicate that the seller of the New Service is being
compensated not only for what it provides in the New Service market, but
also for providing something in the Old Product market. As a result, the
New Service would be serving at least in part as a substitute for the Old
Product, and would not be entitled to the same legal treatment as a pure
complement. 55 As described below, this approach was echoed, though in a
slightly different context, in the Court's recent Grokster decision.56
Turning again specifically to P2P services, and applying this test, neither
the price for Napster nor that for Grokster varied with the particular
recordings or files that the programs are used to transfer. 57 Moreover, the
desirability of P2P programs to their users is not likely to differ with the
availability of particular files. That is, the value of Napster, say, to one of
its users is likely the same even if that user's favorite song is not available
through Napster. The value of the services might be less, it is true, if the
user's favorite musical genre were not available, but even that seems
unlikely. Users value the P2P programs for the facility with which they
enable transfers of content in general, not for their ability to enable copying
of particular content.
The situation is different for AdWords, which is represented in this
amended version of Figure 2:
54. There might be other ways to demonstrate that the two markets are not distinct. In
Grokster, for example, the Supreme Court relied upon several types of evidence in reversing
the summary judgment for defendants. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781-82 (2005). Even if that showed that the New Service profited
from the Old Product, though, it did not show that it profited from any particular Old
Product. But see infra note 88.
55. It is worth clarifying here the limits on this point. They can be illustrated by
considering that a product A in one market can be complementary to a product B in another
even if the price of A depends on the particular product B with which A is used. For
example, one might pay more for butter for use with very good bread than for use with more
mediocre bread. But it is at least in part the fact that butter is purchased separately from
bread that makes it reasonable to believe that despite the potential for different prices for
butter with different breads, the buyer is still paying for butter. If one purchased butter and
bread together, and the price was higher when better bread was purchased with the butter, we
would be inclined to believe that the higher price reflected a payment for the bread.
56. See infra note 88.
57. But see infra text accompanying notes 83-88 (discussing the profitability of
advertisements for the P2P services).
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Trademarks Used byTrademarks Used by Sellers that Are NotTrademark OwnersOwners
Traditional Uses Google (Including AdWords Used by
(Advertising, etc.) AdWords used by Seller Other than
Trademark Owner) Trademark Owner
X"- "" T ---- N -
Consumer Looking for
Trademark Owner's
Products
Consumer Looking for
Product Without
Regard to Seller
Figure 4.
This figure emphasizes the parallel with P2P services. With P2P services,
users are able to transfer files without the permission of the copyright
owners; with AdWords, sellers are able to use keywords without the
permission of the trademark owners. 58
The key point for present purposes lies in the pricing of AdWords. The
price that a user pays for AdWords depends on the particular trademark or
other keyword that the user purchases. 59 Thus, AdWords is not just
charging for its innovation in creating the AdWords service, but also is
charging for the keywords that sellers purchase. In that respect, it is not
operating solely in the AdWords market, but also in the trademark market.
Consequently, it is appropriate to hold AdWords secondarily liable for the
effects of infringement in that market.
This point is related to the fact that, as described above, AdWords may
cause a decrease in the demand for the trademark. If AdWords were
compensated solely in a purely complementary AdWords market, it would
suffer from lessened demand for trademarks, because that would also mean
58. As discussed in note 89 infra, there is nevertheless dispute over whether this
qualifies as trademark infringement.
59. Although the AdWords pricing structure is not entirely transparent, ad placement
depends on the maximum cost-per-click specified by advertisers, Google AdWords Help
Center: How Are Ads Ranked?,
https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer-6111 (last visited Sept. 12,
2005). Because advertisers will care more about placement in search results for popular
keywords, they will presumably bid more for those keywords.
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less demand for AdWords. That is, Google would not, if its interests were
purely in the AdWords market, engage in conduct that would lessen the
value of trademarks. But if the conduct that decreases the value of
trademarks also benefits AdWords, as the AdWords payments do, that
benefit may outweigh the harm to Google in the AdWords market.60
Thus, the rule proposed here-that secondary liability turn on whether
compensation to the provider of the New Service is dependent on particular
Old Products provided by the New Service-is appropriate from two
perspectives. First, such dependence makes it unclear whether the provider
of the New Service is operating solely in the market for that New Service; it
may instead be operating as well in the market for the Old Product, and thus
reasonably be held liable for infringement in that market. Second, such
dependence is evidence that the New Service need not be profitable solely
as a complement to the Old Product, since the provider's profits in the Old
Product market could induce the introduction of the New Service.
V. THE PROPOSED RULE AND CURRENT DOCTRINE
The rule proposed above in fact echoes both the Supreme Court's
analysis in Sony and Professor Ginsburg's discussion of the Court's other
contributory infringement decisions. 6 1 As described above, in Sony the
Supreme Court drew on patent law in its contributory infringement
analysis.6 2 Although the Court ultimately stated its test in terms of whether
there was a "substantial noninfringing use," it also said, echoing patent law
again, that "contributory infringement is confined to the knowing sale of a
component especially made for use in connection with a particular
patent." 63
Pricing of a New Service that is dependent on particular Old Products
would presumably meet the Court's requirement, because the pricing would
indicate that the service was especially adapted to those products. In
contrast, a New Service that is priced independently of the Old Products
might have an effect on the Old Product market generally, but that appears
to be viewed by the Court as insufficient. The Court specifically addressed
the fact that although VCRs did not facilitate the copying of particular
movies, they did facilitate the copying of movies generally. The Court did
not view that effect as justifying contributory infringement liability.64 In
fact, it was quite adamant in rejecting such liability: It described as
60. I have more fully discussed this characteristic of information intermediaries in Mark
R. Patterson, On the Impossibility of Information Intermediaries (Fordham Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 13, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=276968.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 25-38.
62. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
see also supra notes 25-30.
63. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at441 n.21.
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"extraordinary" the view that "all copyright owners collectively" could
control VCRs. 65
Suppose, in an analogy to the Napster and Grokster cases, 66 that a maker
of chemical compounds produced a compound that was useful in the
manufacture of nine patented drugs and one unpatented drug, but that the
compound was not particularly suited for any specific drug. Although I am
not aware of any such case, 6 7 liability in these circumstances seems
unlikely, absent any other evidence. These facts do not seem to meet the
requirement of § 271(c) that the allegedly infringing product be especially
made for use in infringing any particular patent, If, on the other hand, the
manufacturer of the compound sold it at a higher price to those who used it
to manufacture drugs that infringed patents than to others, liability would be
more likely.68
Adopting an approach focused on the relationship between the New
Service and particular Old Products would thus strengthen the parallel
between copyright and patent doctrine. It might also help eliminate some
confusing differences between the two areas of law. Under patent law,
secondary liability includes liability both for inducing infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and for contributory infringement under § 271(c), the
section on which Sony based its test. In Grokster, though, the Supreme
Court relied on an inducement theory, emphasizing evidence of actual
intent, but described it as an aspect of contributory infringement. 69 At least
part of the reason for the different labels in the two areas may be
65. Id. at 441.
66. In Grokster, the Court referred to evidence of a study commissioned by the plaintiffs
that showed that "nearly 90%" of the files available were copyrighted. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005).
67. In patent cases, courts do not seem to focus on percentages of infringing and
noninfringing use, despite the "substantial" requirement in § 271(c). 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(2000). Instead, they focus, as is suggested in this Article, on whether the product is
especially adapted to infringing use:
[T]he proper test to determine if a device that can practice non-infringing methods,
but allows practice of a patented method, is a staple, is that the practice of the
patented method must be incidental and necessary due to technological limitations.
If the practice of the patented method is incidental and necessary to the practice of
the unpatented methods, the device is a staple and there can be no contributory
infringement. If, on the other hand, the practice of the patented method is not
necessary or incidental to the practice of the unpatented methods, a jury could find
that the device as a whole is not staple and the seller could be liable for
contributory infringement.
Oak Indus. Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-39 (N.D. 111. 1989)
(citations omitted).
68. Although I am unaware of any case presenting these facts, Fromberg, Inc. v.
Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963), is somewhat similar. In Fromberg, the alleged
contributory infringer sold a part that could be used with either a patented invention or a
noninfringing product. Id. at 414. The cost of the defendant's part was two to three times the
cost of alternatives available for the noninfringing use, and the court found this significant in
suggesting (though remanding for a determination by the trial court) that the part was a
nonstaple good. Id. at 414 & n.19.
69. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
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uncertainty regarding the role of contributory infringement in copyright, an
uncertainty that could be lessened by tying it to the better-defined
contributory infringement theory of patent law. 70
Of course, it is not necessarily the case that a stronger parallel between
copyright doctrine and patent doctrine is desirable. In one of the amicus
briefs filed in the Grokster litigation, Professors Peter Menell, David
Nimmer, Robert Merges, and Justin Hughes argue that it was inappropriate
for Sony to derive its test from patent law. 71 Patent law's staple-article-of-
commerce doctrine is intended to prevent leveraging from one technology
to another, but they argue that this principle is inapplicable to copyright,
where the initial innovation is authorship, not technology. 72 They contend
that a new technology can "threaten the very economic foundation of entire
content industries (and even multiple industries). ' 73 But the reverse is true
as well: Allowing content industries control over new technologies can
threaten the very economic foundation of the development of those
technologies. 74
As described above, the Supreme Court has attempted to strike a balance
between these two concerns, and the approach proposed here is consistent
with the Court's earlier contributory infringement cases in the copyright
area. In the cases in which the Court has upheld such liability, the
defendants, such as radio stations and hotels, can be viewed as profiting
directly from the value of the specific content that they used. But in cases
in which the Court has rejected liability, there was no such direct
connection. In fact, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc., and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, where the
defendants were cable rebroadcasters of broadcast television, the Court
relied specifically on this point. 75 The rebroadcasters carried all of the
content of the original broadcasters, without selecting particular programs,
and the Court emphasized this point: "Broadcasters select the programs to
be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever
programs they receive." 76  Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the
rebroadcasters did not sell advertising in association with the copyrighted
programs they retransmitted. 77
70. Cf id. at 2776 n.9 (acknowledging that "the lines between direct infringement,
contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn" (internal quotations
omitted)).
71. Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges & Justin
Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10-15, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 176675.
72. See id. at 11-12.
73. Id. at 12.
74. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 34; Wu, supra note 9.
75. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
76. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 403 (quoting Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400).
77. Id. at 405 & n.10. This is now a statutory requirement. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3)
(2000).
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VI. STATUTORY REMEDIES
The discussion above of current doctrine, 78 and of the proposed
interpretation of it, is not intended to suggest that changes would not be
appropriate. Indeed, Congress has responded with legislation in similar
circumstances, when other new technologies have arisen with implications
for copyright protection. In their Grokster brief, Professor Menell et al.
argue that these past congressional responses to "dual-use" technologies
indicate that Congress is not of the view that such technologies should
necessarily be free from copyright liability.79 But not every dual-use
technology is the same, and past congressional responses would indicate a
need for change only if current doctrine produced a result different from the
approach that Congress has preferred.
In fact, the statutes adopted by Congress have been consistent with the
approach advocated here. That is, they have generally reflected a focus on
whether the producers of the technology at issue would profit from specific
content. In some instances, such as rentals of sound recordings and
software, the statutes address circumstances in which sellers would profit
from specific content, and they ban such rentals. 80
More telling is Congress's response to digital audio recording devices in
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA"). 81 The AHRA was a
response to the introduction of digital audio recorders that make perfect
copies of music recordings. That technology is thus similar to that
underlying Napster and Grokster, in that it would allow users easily to make
copies of copyrighted works. It is also similar to Napster and Grokster in
that the seller of a digital audio recording device would not charge different
prices based on the content that a user might record. Consequently, under
the test proposed here, the sellers of the recording devices would not be
secondarily liable for users' infringing activities.
Nevertheless, Congress might reasonably have been concerned about the
widespread infringement that could result from the introduction of the
products, and it responded through the AHRA. Interestingly, the AHRA
can be viewed as reflecting exactly the focus advocated here. It imposes
non-content-specific fees on the sellers of digital audio recorders, and it
distributes the revenue by value of content. 82 In that respect, it reflects the
problem of collective copyright enforcement recognized by Sony, and it
effectively performs the collective-to-particular translation required to
respond to that problem. Secondary infringement liability in the courts
78. See supra Part II.
79. Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges & Justin
Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 71, at 15-19.
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
81. Id. §§ 1001-1010.
82. See id. §§ 1003-1007; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Audio Recording
Technology Factsheet on Filing Claims for Royalty Distribution,
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/dartfact.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
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cannot easily respond in that way, and is thus a less satisfactory means of
dealing with these issues.
VII. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED APPROACH
The approach proposed here suggests that Google should be liable for
contributory infringement for its AdWords program but that P2P services
should not generally be liable. It is worth considering, in addition, whether
there should be liability for other entities involved with AdWords and P2P
services. For example, a focus of the Grokster decision was advertisements
on the Grokster web site.83 Should sellers that advertise there be liable?
The Court did not suggest that the advertisers paid different rates based on
specific content, and it is not clear, given the structure of Grokster, that they
could have done so. Consequently, under the test proposed here, neither
Grokster nor the advertisers would be liable.
In this respect, Napster could have been different. One could imagine
that advertisers on the Napster site, where users went to locate specific
content, could have paid different rates based on the content requested. In
that case, Napster itself would have been liable under the test proposed
here. Should the advertisers themselves also have been liable, for paying
for advertising related to specific content? The emphasis of the test, after
all, is on whether the party receives payment based on specific content, not
on whether it makes such payments. But the advertisers presumably also
would have profited from the advertising, and profited more from
advertising based on some content than on other. Consequently, they too
should have been liable under those circumstances.
It is not entirely clear whether these results would be consistent with the
Grokster decision. The Court in Grokster, using an approach different from
the one described here, concluded that there was substantial evidence that
the P2P services intended to induce infringement, and the Court relied on
the advertising on the defendants' sites in reaching that conclusion.84 But
because the Court relied on what it viewed as evidence of actual intent
rather than imputed intent,85 the decision was not inconsistent with the
approach described here, which is directed at a contributory infringement
theory.86 In any event, the Court noted that the advertising evidence on
which it relied "alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent," 87
83. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781-82
(2005).
84. See id. at 2781.
85. See id. at 2778-80.
86. Actually, the Court in Grokster described its actual intent theory as an aspect of
contributory infringement, in contrast to vicarious liability, which the Court suggested
requires neither actual nor imputed intent, but is based on profit. See id. at 2776. In this
Article, the term contributory infringement is used more narrowly, as it is in patent law and it
was in Sony, to refer to liability based on distribution of a product that facilitates
infringement by others. Cf id at 2776-79 (discussing Sony).
87. Id. at 2782.
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reflecting its focus on the more direct evidence of actual intent, where
different principles may be appropriate. 88
The principles applied above to P2P services apply also to the AdWords
advertisers who pay for placement in the results of searches of trademarks.
But although this Article has treated Google as the secondary infringer, it
actually is not entirely clear whether the advertisers or Google should be
viewed as the direct infringer of the trademarks (or indeed if either
should 89). The assumption here has been that the advertisers should be
viewed as infringing the trademarks by "advertising" with those marks; in
that case, Google would be the secondary infringer. But perhaps Google is
the direct infringer, since it is the entity that (mis)directs users seeking the
trademark; in that case, the secondary liability question would be asked of
the advertisers, not of Google. In fact, plaintiffs in the Google cases allege
both theories, and the courts do not always clearly distinguish between
them.
To some extent, the advertisers who purchase the keywords seem to be
analogous to the Napster advertisers discussed above. The AdWords
advertisers, too, presumably expect to profit from their purchases, and
therefore liability may seem appropriate. A critical difference, though, is
that the Napster advertisers' profits would be based simply on the numbers
of users delivered to them. The AdWords purchasers would presumably
profit only if users found their products more attractive than those of the
seller whose trademark they purchased through AdWords. That is, the
AdWords purchasers are presumably competing directly with the trademark
owners, whereas the Napster adyertisers operate in different markets. As
such, it is more appropriate to assess the AdWords advertisers as possible
direct infringers, rather than as possible secondary infringers. 90
88. It nevertheless seems questionable, for the reasons discussed here, to rely on the sort
of advertising discussed by the Court even to support inducement liability. Although it is
true, as the Court said, that the advertising showed that Grokster profited in some sense from
the infringement, as, presumably, did the advertisers, in both cases the profit was only from
infringement in general, not from any specific infringements. See id. at 2781. That seemed
not to be a concern of the Court, though, since the same was true of the other evidence of
actual intent relied upon by the Court. See id Interestingly, though, some of the intent
evidence described by the Court appears to have been focused on particular copyrighted
works: "Morpheus [i.e., Streamcast, Grokster's codefendant] in fact allowed users to search
specifically for 'Top 40' songs, which were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly, Grokster sent
users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted materials."
Id. at 2774 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2781 ("And both companies communicated a
clear message by responding affirmatively to requests for help in locating and playing
copyrighted materials.").
89. Whether the use of trademarks in AdWords and similar programs is a "use" for
purposes of the Lanham Act is an issue disputed in these cases. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409-13 (2d Cir. 2005); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind &
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *17-31 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 2005); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702-04
(E.D. Va. 2004). Regardless, other theories, such as unfair competition, might also be
applicable.
90. See, e.g., Gov't Employees, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
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The same is true, to take another example, of web sellers that are accused
of trademark infringement for including trademarks as metatags in their
web pages. 91 The metatags are read by search engines, which then include
those web pages in their search results for the marks used as metatags. The
web sites that include the trademarks obviously benefit more from certain
specific trademarks than others-as do those who purchase trademarks as
AdWords keywords-but they benefit only to the extent that they can
persuade visitors to purchase their product rather than the trademark
owner's-again, as with AdWords. Hence the metatag cases have analyzed
the metatag users as possible direct infringers. One might ask, then,
whether the search engines could be viewed as secondary infringers in these
cases. Under the test proposed here, they would not be, because they do not
derive any more profit from delivering searchers to the sites with the
metatags than to any other sites. In that respect, the metatag cases are very
different from AdWords, where Google's involvement is much greater.
Finally, consider another Google search example: Google Print. With
this new program, Google is putting books into a digital format and
providing the ability to search the books' contents. 92 Because this involves
copying the books, publishers have expressed concern about what they view
as a program of copyright infringement. 93 This aspect of the program
would involve only Google as a possible infringer, so if it were infringing,
it would be doing so directly. The program is also intended to display
portions of the books, though, and one can see a number of pages from
some books.94 If the amount that Google allowed a user to see were
sufficient to prompt a copyright challenge, it is possible that both could be
viewed as direct infringers.
A more interesting scenario is to consider that Google's copying of the
books and provision of the search facility might be viewed as fair use.95
Consider then the analysis if users downloaded many pages from the books
that they searched. In this case, Google would be much like Napster: It
would provide users with the capacity to search for copyrighted files, and it
would perhaps fail to use the ability to prevent users from violating the
91. See, e.g., Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003);
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
92. Google Print, http://print.google.com/googleprint/about.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
93. See, e.g., Posting of Gary Price to SearchEngineWatch,
http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/050711-155348 (July 11, 2005).
94. Google Print will show only a "limited amount" of copyrighted books, and "a set of
pages in every in-copyright book will be unavailable to all users." Google Print Help,
http://print.google.com/googleprint/help.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). But significant
portions of some books are available.
95. Google argues that its Print program serves to increase, rather than decrease, demand
for the books. For codification of the fair use doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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copyrights on those files. 96 But it would also be like Napster in that it
would not profit more from particular copyright violations, 97 so it too
should be viewed as in a separate market for purposes of contributory
infringement and thus not liable.
These points can be summarized in the following table:
Profit Derived in Related Profit Also RequiresMarket Direct Competition withContent Used
Direct liability, rather
Profit Derived Contributory liability than contributory liability
from Con roriaty (purchasers of trademarks
Specific (Google with AdWords in AdWords, metatags,
Content Google Print with respect
to own copying)
Contributory liability not
Profit Derived appropriate, at least
from without inducement No contributory or direct
Content in (Grokster, maybe Napster, liability
General Google Print with respect
to user copying)
As this table illustrates, contributory infringement liability is appropriate
only in certain circumstances. Specifically, it is appropriate where the
activity of the alleged contributory infringer is, on the one hand, sufficiently
closely related to that of the direct infringement but, on the other, not so
closely related as to constitute competition with the intellectual property
owner. A sufficiently close relationship is not established by sale of a
product in a complementary market that has no connection to specific
products in the market where the direct infringement occurs. In that
respect, P2P services escape liability (in the absence of statute), but
Google's AdWords may not. On the other hand, where there is a
connection to specific infringed products, but the nature of that connection
requires competition with those products, it is direct infringement that is at
96. It may be that Google's current precautions, see supra note 94, would be sufficient
to prevent copyright violations, but given the amount that it currently (as of August 20,
2005) allows one to view, that seems questionable.
97. One might take the view that because copyright violations are more likely when
users look at multiple pages of copyrighted works, then if Google sold ads for each page
viewed, it would profit more from infringements. This would be similar to the argument
made by the Supreme Court in Grokster regarding advertising. See supra text accompanying
notes 83-88. The argument has the same weaknesses here regarding contributory
infringement.
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issue. It is only between these two poles-where a seller profits from the
infringement of specific intellectual property without competing with that
property-that contributory infringement liability is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The law regarding contributory liability in the copyright arena is
uncertain. Sony's "substantial noninfringing use" test, which the Supreme
Court adopted for so-called "dual-use" products that do not themselves
infringe but enable both infringing and noninfringing conduct by others, is
subject to a variety of interpretations. This Article proposes an
interpretation of the test that returns to its patent-law roots by focusing on
the relationship between the market for the dual-use product and the
adjacent market for the intellectual property at issue. Specifically, the test
proposed here asks whether the seller of the dual-use product profits from
infringement of particular intellectual property in the adjacent market. Only
if it does so is liability for contributory infringement appropriate.
This Article discusses this test in the context of two paradigmatic types
of cases: those involving P2P services like Napster and Grokster, and those
involving Google's AdWords, a program that allows advertisers to purchase
placement in the results of searches for others' trademarks. This Article
concludes that P2P services should generally not be liable for contributory
infringement (which of course would not preclude a statutory imposition of
liability), but that Google should. More importantly than these specific
conclusions, though, is that this test takes at least a step toward reconciling
contributory infringement law in the patent, copyright, and trademark
contexts.
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